Per a universalist account, differences in particular efficacious gracings (manners & degrees of divine presencing) could ensue from divine predilections as would be ordered toward various theophanic exceptionalities & beatitudinal superabundances. There would be no need for repugnant pseudo-ends or everlasting parasitic evils. e.g. perdition wouldn’t even be a real possibility.
Rational creatures would be adequately determined & sufficiently free, even given divine realities like decrees, predilections, elections, predestinations, inancaritability & efficacious gracings, however we may otherwise variously choose to ground divine epistemology.
To the extent reality’s determined, per divine intent, even a protological Edenic existence could require some subeschatological aspects, e.g. a certain degree of epistemic distancing (fallibility) as would be ordered to any rational agent’s freedom, which would be integral to the synergistic (non-necessitating) dynamics of any & all theotic processes.
That intrinsic fallibility, coupled with ontic indeterminacies, would be ordered toward the facilitation of such co-creative ontic novelties, as would contribute to the augmentation of the divine aesthetic scope, theophanically, as well as the amplification of our creaturely enjoyments, beatitudinally.
To the extent that any of these co-creative novelties might introduce ontic “defections,” those could be simply apparent “deviations.” If not, still, might they not otherwise be merely accidental and/or even instrumentally bootstrapped for emergent regularities (dynamical essences)?
To the extent such deviations & defectibilities introduce realities that are apparently evil, as they might be variously interpreted by rational creatures, who could be differently or even similarly situated, still, those ontic-departures could be pre-moral, which is to say, not sinful even if clearly mistaken.
This is all just to suggest that “adequate” degrees of theological determinism needn’t entail that moral evil is to any extent divinely intended for its own sake (with some mysterious non-instrumental value). Rather, consistent with sufficient degrees of freedom & autonomy, moral evil needn’t be interpreted as in any measure indispensable or positively willed by God, but only ever victoriously vanquished by God & to be purged by His grace.
None of this would necessarily rule out God instrumentally co-opting temporary ontic evils, which, as DBH says, “God will heal and abolish as abhorrent to His ultimate intentions in creation.”
To be clear, DBH responds regarding the things we might learn from moral evil: “The things thus learned, I still maintain, are learned contingently by way of defect and so such lessons
contain no knowledge or moral joy that the direct vision of the divine Good would not impart in the absence of sin. I deny that evil makes any actual
instrumental increase to the good.“
Everything above does rule out the moral absurdity & logical irrationality of eternal suffering, which has no purchase on reality such that it could be justified either instrumentally or non-instrumentally. By contrast, some degree of epistemic distancing seems to be positively willed by God as clearly integral to our ultimate flourishing & some forms of ontic novelty seem to be clearly integral to our creaturely co-creativity.
Which ontic novelties represent nonmoral deviations that are co-creatively bootstrappable, which involve the introduction of mere ontic evils (real or just apparent) & which result from what are clear moral evils requires discernment.
I haven’t quite sorted out which of our historical realities were clearly divinely intended & which were merely divinely tolerated & permitted, but I have found that our best competing accounts of Providence, divine sovereignty & human freedom will employ some perichoretic model of divine-human interactivity.
When we employ a dialectical logic, such as an hypostatic posilivity, to supplement an analogical grammar, such as the analogy of being, it doesn’t mean no mysterian residue remains or that we’ve achieved explanatory adequacy. It can, however, provide a robustly exploratory heuristic by which one can mine existentially actionable meaning even from what may be utterly incomprehensible mysteries.
Universalists can afford to be eclectic in fashioning models of divine-human interactivity. Various elements of almost every metaphysical idiom & divine sovereignty model can be more readily woven together in ways that work more seamlessly, theologically, and with fewer contrivances, philosophically, precisely because one can employ any & all of those competing idioms & models as cascading metaphors, none of which will facilely collapse from having to bite some perditionism bullet, e.g. while sewing together threads of predestination & efficacious grace with freedom.
Ergo, while I have found competing Classical Theistic accounts sufficiently coherent (but only when coupled with a universalist eschatology; sub-eschatological, edenic protology; & single-storeyed theo-anthropology, i.e. no concrete natura pura), I personally employ a much more personalist approach that’s not allergic, even, to some process conceptions (e.g. dynamical Christogony of the Totus Christus) and that unhesitatingly incorporates certain open theist notions.
All that given, certain classical theist conceptions remain indispensable to my approach, which, for example, also requires, at least, only a weakened DDS (simplicity) & only a thin passibility.
This is all set forth in my latest revision of my Neo-Chalcedonian, Franciscan Cosmotheandric Universalism of Apokatastenai
Syncretistic Catholicism 